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Public consultation on an EU Anti-Coercion Instrument

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Introduction

In recent years, there has been an increase in the practice of non-EU countries seeking to coerce the EU or EU Member States to take – or not take – particular measures. Non-EU countries seek to coerce sometimes by using measures that restrict trade or investment to the detriment of EU economic operators. Such practices unduly interfere with the legitimate policymaking space of the EU and its Member States.

This consultation is about the European Commission's commitment to propose a <u>new legal instrument to deter and counteract such coercion</u>. The consultation is open to all organisations and individuals (both in the EU and outside). It is available in all official EU languages, and respondents may reply in any of those languages. It consists of a survey divided into 4 susbtantive sections, with an oportunity for respondents to submit further information (such as a position paper) at the end.

This initiative is distinct from initiatives announced in the <u>Communication "The European economic and financial system: fostering openness, strength and resilience"</u>. As announced in that Communication, the Commission will work on additional policy options to further deter and counteract the unlawful extra-territorial application of unilateral sanctions by non-EU countries to EU economic operators (including possibly by amending <u>Regulation (EC) No 2271 /96</u>, the 'Blocking Statute').

The Commission will pursue both initiatives and will ensure they are consistent. Information obtained in the consultations for each initiative that is relevant to the other will be shared (and any confidential information protected).

About you

- *Language of my contribution
 - Bulgarian
 - Croatian

0	Czech
0	Danish
	Dutch
	English
	Estonian
	Finnish
0	French
	German
	Greek
	Hungarian
0	Irish
	Italian
0	Latvian
0	Lithuanian
0	Maltese
0	Polish
0	Portuguese
	Romanian
0	Slovak
	Slovenian
	Spanish
0	Swedish
*I am	giving my contribution as
0	Academic/research institution
•	Business association
0	Company/business organisation
0	Consumer organisation
0	EU citizen
0	Environmental organisation
0	Non-EU citizen
	Non-governmental organisation (NGO)
	Public authority
	Trade union
0	Other

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murat.oezdemir@ave-ir	ntl.de		
*Organisation name			
255 character(s) maximum			
AVE International			
*Organisation size			
Micro (1 to 9 en	nnlovees)		
Small (10 to 49			
	249 employees)		
Large (250 or m			
Large (200 of fi	1010)		
Transparency registe	er number		
255 character(s) maximum			
Check if your organisation is influence EU decision-making		<u>er</u> . It's a voluntary database fo	r organisations seeking to
663095315894-59			
*Country of origin			
Please add your country of o	origin, or that of your organi	sation.	
Afghanistan	Djibouti	Libya	Saint Martin
Åland Islands	Dominica	Liechtenstein	Saint Pierre
			and Miquelon
Albania	Dominican	Lithuania	Saint Vincent
	Republic		and the
			Grenadines
Algeria	Ecuador	Luxembourg	Samoa

AmericanSamoa	Egypt	Macau	San Marino
Andorra	El Salvador	Madagascar	São Tomé and Príncipe
Angola	Equatorial Guinea	Malawi	Saudi Arabia
Anguilla	Eritrea	Malaysia	Senegal
Antarctica	Estonia	Maldives	Serbia
Antigua and Barbuda	Eswatini	Mali	Seychelles
Argentina	Ethiopia	Malta	Sierra Leone
Armenia	Falkland Islands	Marshall Islands	Singapore
Aruba	Faroe Islands	Martinique	Sint Maarten
Australia	Fiji	Mauritania	Slovakia
Austria	Finland	Mauritius	Slovenia
Azerbaijan	France	Mayotte	Solomon Islands
Bahamas	French Guiana	Mexico	Somalia
Bahrain	French	Micronesia	South Africa
Damam	Polynesia	Wildforfesia	Coulii Airica
Bangladesh	French Southern and Antarctic Lands	Moldova	South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands
Barbados	Gabon	Monaco	South Korea
Belarus	Georgia	Mongolia	South Sudan
Belgium	Germany	Montenegro	Spain
Belize	Ghana	Montserrat	Sri Lanka
Benin	Gibraltar	Morocco	Sudan
Bermuda	Greece	Mozambique	Suriname
Bhutan	Greenland	Myanmar /Burma	Svalbard and Jan Mayen
Bolivia	Grenada	Namibia	Sweden

©	Bonaire Saint Eustatius and Saba	0	Guadeloupe	0	Nauru	0	Switzerland
0	Bosnia and Herzegovina	0	Guam	0	Nepal	0	Syria
0	Botswana	0	Guatemala	0	Netherlands		Taiwan
0	Bouvet Island	0	Guernsey	0	New Caledonia	0	Tajikistan
0	Brazil		Guinea	0	New Zealand	0	Tanzania
0	British Indian Ocean Territory	0	Guinea-Bissau	0	Nicaragua	0	Thailand
0	British Virgin Islands	0	Guyana	0	Niger	0	The Gambia
	Brunei		Haiti		Nigeria		Timor-Leste
0	Bulgaria		Heard Island and McDonald Islands		Niue		Togo
	Burkina Faso		Honduras		Norfolk Island		Tokelau
0	Burundi	0	Hong Kong	0	Northern Mariana Islands	0	Tonga
0	Cambodia	0	Hungary	0	North Korea	0	Trinidad and Tobago
0	Cameroon	0	Iceland	0	North Macedonia	0	Tunisia
	Canada		India		Norway		Turkey
	Cape Verde		Indonesia		Oman		Turkmenistan
	Cayman Islands		Iran		Pakistan		Turks and
							Caicos Islands
0	Central African Republic	0	Iraq	0	Palau	0	Tuvalu
	Chad		Ireland		Palestine		Uganda
	Chile		Isle of Man		Panama		Ukraine
	China		Israel		Papua New		United Arab
					Guinea		Emirates
0	Christmas Island	0	Italy	0	Paraguay	0	United Kingdom

0	Clipperton	Jamaica	0	Peru	0	United States
0			0		0	
	Cocos (Keeling)	Japan		Philippines		United States
	Islands					Minor Outlying
						Islands
	Colombia	Jersey		Pitcairn Islands		Uruguay
	Comoros	Jordan		Poland	0	US Virgin
						Islands
0	Congo	Kazakhstan	0	Portugal		Uzbekistan
0	Cook Islands	Kenya		Puerto Rico		Vanuatu
0	Costa Rica	Kiribati	0	Qatar		Vatican City
0	Côte d'Ivoire	Kosovo		Réunion		Venezuela
0	Croatia	Kuwait		Romania		Vietnam
0	Cuba	Kyrgyzstan	0	Russia		Wallis and
						Futuna
0	Curaçao	Laos		Rwanda		Western
						Sahara
0	Cyprus	Latvia	0	Saint		Yemen
				Barthélemy		
0	Czechia	Lebanon		Saint Helena		Zambia
				Ascension and		
				Tristan da		
				Cunha		
0	Democratic	Lesotho	0	Saint Kitts and	0	Zimbabwe
	Republic of the	20000		Nevis		
	Congo					
0	Denmark	Liberia	0	Saint Luaia		
	Dellillaik	LIDEIIA		Saint Lucia		

The Commission will publish all contributions to this public consultation. You can choose whether you would prefer to have your details published or to remain anonymous when your contribution is published. Fo r the purpose of transparency, the type of respondent (for example, 'business association, 'consumer association', 'EU citizen') country of origin, organisation name and size, and its transparency register number, are always published. Your e-mail address will never be published. Opt in to select the privacy option that best suits you. Privacy options default based on the type of respondent selected

If you have questions about the treatment of confidential information or generally about the initiative, contact us: trade-anti-coercion@ec.europa.eu

^{*}Contribution publication privacy settings

The Commission will publish the responses to this public consultation. You can choose whether you would like your details to be made public or to remain anonymous.

Anonymous

Only organisation details are published: The type of respondent that you responded to this consultation as, the name of the organisation on whose behalf you reply as well as its transparency number, its size, its country of origin and your contribution will be published as received. Your name will not be published. Please do not include any personal data in the contribution itself if you want to remain anonymous.

Public

Organisation details and respondent details are published: The type of respondent that you responded to this consultation as, the name of the organisation on whose behalf you reply as well as its transparency number, its size, its country of origin and your contribution will be published. Your name will also be published.

I agree with the personal data protection provisions

Coercive practices by non-EU countries - problem defintion

1. Do you agree with the following provisional definition for coercive practices by non-EU countries?

Coercive practices by non-EU countries are measures which seek to, or could, coerce public authorities in the EU to take, not take, or withdraw, particular policy measures. These practices may include the use or threat of coercion, possibly in the form of trade or investment restrictions. The coercion may or may not be based on existing legislation, and can affect any field in which the EU or its Member States are active.

V	~~
I	ヒ٥

Partly

O No

Neutral

Would you suggest to change it or add anything?

1500 character(s) maximum

I would complement "public authorities" and add "private entitities".

2. In your experience, are the following elements present when a non-EU country takes
coercive action (whether directed at the EU, an EU Member State or another non-EU
country)?

	Always	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	No opinion
Intention or potential to interfere with policy choices of another country	V					
Reaction to a specific policy measure or inaction by another country	V					
In the form of measures that restrict trade	V					
In the form of measures that restrict investment	V					
In the form of other economic restrictions	V					
In breach of international law	V	V				

Othar	alamant	bne 2	furthar	comments
Other	element	s anu	ıurıner	Comments

1500 chara	cter(s) maximum			

3. Would you differentiate between different types of coercion – in general or by describing a specific case? If you describe a case, try to provide evidence.

1500 character(s) maximum

Yes, direct and indirect coercion (the latter one in form of collaterals).

4. Do you have evidence of non-EU countries' legislation either specifically designed to impose coercive measures on other countries or that can be used for that? Or evidence of unwritten measures or practices that are used for coercion?

Please make your entries in the table below.

We recall that your contribution will be published only in accordance with your indicated preferences. If you want to submit confidential information please contact us at trade-anti-coercion@ec.europa.eu.

	Country	Piece of legislation, written or unwritten measure - describe	Type of coercive action	Cases when the coercion was applied (countries involved/timing /sector, etc.)	Objective	Effect	Other relevant information
1	USA	Export Control Regime	Application based on US' interest	Various	Secure US Interests	Successful in meeting the intention	
2	Turkey	Refugee Deal with EU	Blackmailing	Various Times	Secure Regime interest	Successful in meeting the intention	
3							
4							
5							
6							
7							
8							
9							
10							

5. For the countries indicated above (or for other countries), can you specify how long the internal decision-making process took or the adoption of coercive measures took or would take, counting from the internal decision until entry into force?

		Instantly / Under 10/30/60/90	
	Country	/180 days/ Under a year /	Further comments
		Longer	
1	USA	Perception: Instantly, obeying local time frames though	
2	Turkey	Perception: Instantly	
3			
4			
5			
6			
7			
8			
9			
10			

15	500 character(s) maximum					
	Turkey: Refugee-Deal with EU					
tow	Do you know of any particular coercive action rards the EU, its Member States or another notes) but did not materialise? Please indicate the	on-EU co	ountry (f	or example o	ver the la	
	500 character(s) maximum					
cou	Is there any threat in the medium to long term intry towards the EU, its Member States or ar	•			•	
	Intries involved and situation. 500 character(s) maximum					
use	Could you tell which areas or sectors could be sectors? Why?	e affected	d most if	a particular	non-EU d	ountry:
	Depends on the strategic intention of the coercing cou	ntry, Indiv	ridual asse	essment necess	ary.	
10.	What do you think are the possible drivers of	the coe	rcive pra	actices by no	n-EU coเ	ıntries?
		Very often	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
	Efforts to avoid political, economic or other effects of actions by the EU, Member States or other countries					
	Efforts to prevent EU, Member States or other countries from regulating			V		
	Imposing one's own economic or other model		V			

1

6. Is there currently an imminent threat of a coercive action by a non-EU country towards the

situation.

abroad

world

companies abroad

Imposing the commercial interests of their national

Efforts to limit or influence the conduct of other

countries' economic operators somewhere in the

EU, its Member States or another non-EU country? Please indicate the countries involved and

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strong disag
Loss of jobs and business (opportunities) or investment (opportunities) abroad	V				
Economic costs (other than those above) which distort competition	V				
They weaken the EU's open strategic autonomy.			V		
They undermine the freedom of action for the EU or its Member States to regulate within their own jurisdictions				V	
ther comments 500 character(s) maximum					
		•	•		•

effect did this have on the sector or other interests, economic or otherwise?

Further comments

1500 character(s) maximum

Try to provide evidence (if possible, quantitative) and link these effects to the examples of coercive practices you have given in questions 4 to 8. If the costs are economic, can you estimate by what percentage they increase the cost of selling your product/service? If some of the effects are also due to the extra-territorial application of sanctions by a non-EU-country, please mention those separately.

1500 character(s) maximum

In the Airbus-Boeing-dispute, the German Retail Business was affected by the countermeasures of the Commission towards the US, whilst initially being off topic. Costs for Consumers have increased, and it can be argued what effects such countermeasures really had.

14. As announced in the <u>Communication "The European economic and financial system:</u> <u>fostering openness, strength and resilience"</u>, the Commission will work on additional policy options to further deter and counteract the unlawful extra-territorial application of unilateral sanctions by non-EU countries to EU economic operators (including possibly by amending Regulation (EC) No 2271/96, the 'Blocking Statute').

How the present anti-coercion initiative and future EU initiatives countering the extra-territorial application of non-EU countries' sanctions can reinforce each other to guarantee the EU's open strategic autonomy?

1500 character(s) maximum

Given recent examples, they cannot. Please see Instex in the Iran-Issue. There are more effective tools of reaction than just simple countermeasure, which often do not solve the real problem.

Policy Intervention

The initiative is considering various policy measures in designing a regulation (by the European Parliament and the Council) to empower the Commission – in specific situations where coercion is involved – to intervene in the form of trade, investment or other policy measures against the non-EU country responsible.

Provisionally, such regulation would:

- Specify the situations ("**triggers**" economic coercion or other coercive activities inconsistent with international law) in which action could be taken. These triggers would be the same for all non-EU countries.
- Specify the types of **countermeasures** to be used when a concrete situation arises: trade, investment or other measures in the remit of the EU, which would be adopted consistently with public international law.
- Be applied by the Commission through either implementing or delegating acts within the meaning of Articles 290 and 291 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU.
- Include specific procedures for stakeholder consultation and participation.

This section discusses the need for and appropriateness of an EU policy instrument, and the possible triggers and countermeasures it might contain.

15. Is an EU policy instrument needed to tackle coercive practices by non-EU countries that are directed at the EU or its Member States?

Please bear in mind that when the coercive action is directed at the EU, action at Member State-level is not possible (trade policy measures are taken exclusively at EU level).

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neutral
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

Further comments

1500 character(s) maximum

Having the option to do so, might be reasonable. Doing so, might not be effective with regard to the core of the problem the Commission wants to tackle.

- 16. If you think there is a need for an EU policy instrument to tackle coercive practices, how pressing is it?
 - Pressing need
 - Medium to long term need
 - Possible need
 - No need
 - Neutral

Further comments

1500 character(s) maximum

There are various directives that may already be applied effectively to counteract.

17. Assuming an EU policy instrument is necessary, its general objectives (including for its concrete use) should be the following, to ensure the degree of intervention is appropriate:

	Yes	No	Neutral
Deterrent effect, discouraging non-EU countries from attempting to coerce the EU or a Member State, given that doing so could trigger an EU reaction under the instrument	V		

Imposing an economic cost on the non-EU country coercing the EU or a Member State through countermeasures under the instrument	V		
Inducing the non-EU country to discontinue its coercive action, through the effect of the EU's (potential) use of the instrument	V		
Enhancing the EU's open strategic autonomy (and safeguarding EU interests) through the existence and the use of the instrument	V		
Further comments			
1500 character(s) maximum			
18. Assuming an EU policy instrument is necessary, in which circumstause it to take countermeasures?	ances sh	ould th	ne EU
	Yes	No	Neutral
In any case of coercion		V	
Only when the coercion breaches international law	V		
Only if there is no international adjudicative decision against the EU on the matter	V		
Only when the coercion has significant negative impact	V		
Only when the coercion has significant negative economic impact			
Only when the coercion has significant negative impact on autonomous decision-making in the EU	V		
Only in exceptionally sensitive cases		V	
Only when the coercion affects certain areas		V	
Only after an attempt for a negotiated or diplomatic solution	V		
Only after giving the non-EU country a period to withdraw its measures	V		
Only as a last resort	V		
Further comments			
1500 character(s) maximum			
19. Should the instrument be used by the EU only if the seriousness of	the coei	rcion	
surpasses a certain threshold?			

Yes

[⊚] No

0	Ν	e	utı	ral

20. Assuming an EU policy instrument is necessary and appropriate, are there circumstances in which the EU should not act? In other words, should there be exceptions to using the instrument? If so, which, and why?

1500 character(s) maximum

Considering the effective effects i.e. how precise is the countermeasure, what are the collaterals (population of the country).

21. Indicate in the table below any concerns you might have about an EU policy instrument and its application.

Note that this question seeks general information only. Specific effects in relation to the scenarios of policy intervention or no intervention are discussed in separate questions below.

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Cannot effectively address coercion		V			
Would harm relations with non-EU countries				V	
May result in costs to businesses and consumers, if the measures under the instrument are applied	V				
Would lead to escalation in international relations		V			
Would risk retaliatory measures (albeit illegal) which will result in costs to businesses and consumers	V				
Not needed. There are other means (and instruments) to tackle coercion			V		

Further comments

1	500 character(s) maximum

22. If an EU policy instrument is not necessary or appropriate, what other options does the EU have to tackle coercive practices (if there is a need to tackle them)?

1500 character(s) maximum

Reality based, EU-interest-driven power politics according to the weight the EU has on this planet, leaving no room for double standard accusations against the EU.

23. Countermeasures

An anti-coercion instrument would include the possibility of responding to coercion with countermeasures. The countermeasures would be directed at the country responsible for the coercion.

EU law already includes instruments that allow countermeasures in specific situations. For instance, the <u>EU Trade Enforcement Regulation</u> covers a range of possible countermeasures, on trade in goods, trade in services, certain trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights and certain public procurement measures.

Note that any countermeasures can only be applied consistently with EU and international law. Therefore, please assume that all the examples below would meet this requirement.

23.1. Would the types of countermeasure of the <u>EU Trade Enforcement Regulation</u> be appropriate and effective in an anti-coercion instrument? Which areas should be prioritised in the selection?

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Import and export restrictions on goods	V				
Restrictions on trade in services	V				
Restrictions on public procurement	V				
Restrictions on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights	V				

Further comments

1500 character(s) maximum

Apply "It's the economy, stupid" at all means.

23.2. Bearing in mind the countermeasures available under the <u>EU Trade Enforcement</u> <u>Regulation</u>, what additional types of countermeasures should feature in an EU anti-coercion instrument?

Note that the Commission will be reviewing the EU Trade Enforcement Regulation, in line with its Article 10, and your reply may also be of use in that review.

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Further restrictions on trade in goods	▽				

Restrictions on investment	V		
Further restrictions on public procurement	V		
Further restrictions on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights	V		
Restrictions in other aspects of trade	V		

Further comments

1500 character(s) maximum

Personrelated, individual sanctions for the people in charge.

23.3. Is there any type of countermeasure, field or sector that should be excluded from an EU anti-coercion instrument? Which one and why? How would an exclusion affect the effectiveness of the instrument?

1.	500 character(s) maximum

23.4. For specific non-EU countries, which fields or sectors should be chosen for the countermeasures, if they are to be most effective in deterring coercion?

1500 character(s) maximum

Individual and current assessment needed.

24. An EU anti-coercion instrument should provide for clear, objective criteria for designing and applying countermeasures. Which ones?

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Minimum collateral effects, such as direct and indirect cost for EU business and consumers	V				
Capable of inducing compliance by the coercing country	V				
Temporary measures only (not indefinite)	V				
Countermeasures proportionate to the harm inflicted			V		
Smallest possible administrative burden for EU and national authorities			V		
General EU interest (EU actors affected)		V			

Type of countermeasure linked to the type of coercion		V			
Reaction in the same sector where the coercion takes place			V		
Further comments					
1500 character(s) maximum					
25. What should be the time limit for the cou	ntermeasu	res agair	nst a conc	rete coerci	ve act?
Never for longer than 3 months					
6 months					
1 year					
2 years					
5 years					
Longer					
Until the coercive act is removed					
Your reasons					
500 character(s) maximum					
If the reason for countermeasure remains in plac removal of the coercive act.	e, there is no	need for ti	me limit. The	e limit is subje	ect to the
26. Timeframe for enacting measures - Imp	osing coun	termeas	ures swiftl	y is importa	ant for
protecting the interests at stake, asserting the	ne EU's inte	ernationa	I rights an	d protectin	g its
autonomy firmly and effectively.					
Agree					
Partly agree					
Disagree					
Neutral					
Further comments					
1500 character(s) maximum					
27. Involving stakeholders in the use of the	instrument	(in each	specific o	ease not in	advance)

- Should the Commission consult relevant stakeholders on their respective interests before

taking countermeasures?

\//h	y not?			
VVII	y not:	Agree	Disagree	Neutral
	Because it would delay the process, while speed is important			V
	Not necessary, provided there are objective criteria for designing measures	V		
	Because stakeholders have the opportunity for feedback after the Commission action		V	
,	⁹ Yes			
	No No			
(No Neutral			
	Neutral ar reasons			
	Neutral			
<i>15</i>	Neutral Ir reasons 100 character(s) maximum	l busines	sses for the	damage
<i>15</i>	Neutral Ir reasons 700 character(s) maximum Collaterals, if off initial coercive act-countermeasure, need to be redeemed. Should an EU instrument also provide for compensation to EU	l busines	sses for the	damage
<i>15</i>	Neutral Ir reasons O character(s) maximum Collaterals, if off initial coercive act-countermeasure, need to be redeemed. Should an EU instrument also provide for compensation to EU ered due to the EU countermeasures?	l busines	sses for the	damage
<i>15</i>	Neutral Ir reasons O character(s) maximum Collaterals, if off initial coercive act-countermeasure, need to be redeemed. Should an EU instrument also provide for compensation to EU ered due to the EU countermeasures? Yes	busines	sses for the	damage
29. suff	Neutral Ir reasons O character(s) maximum Collaterals, if off initial coercive act-countermeasure, need to be redeemed. Should an EU instrument also provide for compensation to EU ered due to the EU countermeasures? Yes No	l busines	ses for the	damage

Likely Impact of a Policy Intervention and of No-intervention

30. **No policy intervention** - in this scenario, the EU can rely on existing options. These include standard diplomatic means and the possibility, under certain conditions, for the European Parliament and the Council of the EU to act on the basis of Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU.

Since trade measures are taken exclusively at EU level, there is no possibility for Member States to act directly themselves in this respect.

30.1. What would be the expected benefits of no policy intervention at this stage?

	Very likely	Likely	Not likely	Neutral
Avoiding economic harm in the EU			V	
Avoiding the risk of negative impact on relations with non-EU countries (political or economic)				V
The possibility for a new policy intervention at a later stage remains open				V

1.	500 character(s) maximum

30.2. What would be the costs, including other negative impact?

	Very likely	Likely	Not likely	Neutral
Impaired autonomy for decision-making in the EU		V		
More coercive measures as a result of the failure to deter		V		
Direct costs to your business		V		
Direct costs to consumers	V			
EU's values not being defended sufficiently	V			
There are no costs			V	

Further comments

1500 character(s) maximum			

30.3. In the no-intervention scenario, what is the likely impact - social, environmental, affecting fundamental rights, administrative simplification or burden, etc., if any? Try to give evidence, including quantitative data.

1500 character(s) maximum

The likely impact is the status quo; if the commission realized that there is a need for action, then there must be a reaon behind (and there is).

31. Policy intervention i	n the form of an EU an	ti-coercion instrument -	this scenario
refers to the various polic	measures outlined in o	questions 15 to 26.	

31.1.	What	would	be the	expected	benefits	of an	EU	anti-coer	cion i	nstrumer	nt (its	existen	ce or
use)?	?												

	Very likely	Likely	Not likely	Neutral
An important dissuasive effect towards non-EU countries	V			
A major role in inducing the discontinuation of coercion, once deployed	V			
A rebalancing effect in international relations (in concrete cases)	V			
Protecting EU economic interests (in general and in concrete cases)	V			
Preserving the legitimate policymaking space of the EU and Member States	V			
Projecting the EU as a credible geopolitical actor	V			
Increasing the EU and Member States's resilience	V	V		
Preserving and promoting international trade				V
Overall effectiveness/potential for effectiveness		V		
Enhancing the EU's open strategic autonomy overall				V
Does not preclude the (simultaneous) use of diplomatic means				V

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1.	1500 character(s) maximum					

31.2. What would be the cost or other negative impact of the EU anti-coercion instrument (its existence or use, as relevant)?

	Very likely	Likely	Not likely	Neutral
Harms political relations with non-EU countries			V	
Harms economic relations with non-EU countries			V	
Risk of escalation (i.e. the country responsible for the coercion responds, leading to costs for businesses/consumers)		V		
Direct cost for business and consumers if countermeasures are applied	V			

Indirect cost for business and consumers if countermeasures are applied	V		
Administrative burden, in relation to implementing countermeasures	V		

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1.	500 character(s) maximum

31.3. What is the likely impact - social, environmental, affecting fundamental rights, administrative simplification or burden, etc., if any? Try to give specific evidence, including quantitative data.

1500 character(s) maximum

Countermeasures are eclectic, all areas will be affected directly/indirectly. Collaterals therefore need to be considered as much as possible.

EU and International Law

32. Any EU policy intervention must be compatible with EU and international law. Comments:

1500 character(s) maximum

Yes, no room for different interpretation.

Further Information

If you wish, you may submit further information (such as a position paper).

Only files of the type pdf,txt,doc,docx,odt,rtf are allowed

Contact

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